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Abstract: In 2013, shares of the UK Royal Mail were underpriced by an average of 
approximately nine percent per share, resulting in the government making £180 million less 
than it could have at the time of the initial public offering (IPO). Although the 2014 
independent review by Lord Myners claimed that a price near the levels seen in the aftermarket 
could not have been achieved at the time of the IPO, the Myners Report acknowledged that the 
current price formation process in the UK is not perfect, and that improvements must be made. 
This paper examines the current UK price formation process and argues that, notwithstanding 
its flaws, the present bookbuilding system should not be replaced by an auction system as 
advocated for by the Myners Report. Rather, this paper submits that bookbuilding should be 
retained in light of its significant advantages, albeit with certain regulatory amendments that 
this paper proposes to improve the price formation process. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, shares of the UK Royal Mail were underpriced by an average of approximately nine 
percent per share, resulting in the government making £180 million less than it could have at 
the time of the initial public offering (IPO).1 Although the independent review by Lord Myners 
(the Myners Report) claimed that a price near the levels seen in the aftermarket could not have 
been achieved at the time of the IPO, the Myners Report acknowledged that the current price 
formation process in the UK is not perfect, and improvements must be made.2 Accordingly, 
this paper seeks to analyse the current UK price formation process. Notwithstanding the flaws 
of the bookbuilding process, it is submitted that bookbuilding should not be replaced by 
auctions, as advocated instead in the Myners Report.3 Rather, bookbuilding should be retained 
in light of its significant advantages, albeit with certain regulatory amendments that this paper 
will propose to improve the price formation process. 
This paper extends the current literature, which has largely focused on pricing 
mechanisms in the US and European countries, by specifically examining the UK’s price 
                                               
* LLB (Hons) (Bristol); LLM (Distinction) (London). This paper was written while the author was a LLM 
candidate at the University College of London (UCL) in 2015. The author would like to express her gratitude to 
Visiting Professor Dan Prentice at UCL for his invaluable comments in the earlier drafts of this paper. 
1 David Parker, ‘Selling the Royal Mail’ (2014) 24(4) Public Money & Management 251, 254. 
2 Paul Myners, ‘An Independent Review for the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills: IPOs and 
Bookbuilding in Future HM Government Primary Share Disposals’ (BIS 2014) 7. 
3 ibid 57. 
Building a Better Bookbuilding System – An Examination of the UK’s Bookbuilding Regime 
and Proposed Reforms 
240 
formation process. Whilst most of the literature provides an economic perspective of the price 
formation process, this paper provides an additional dimension by presenting an analysis from 
both an economic and legal point of view. The analysis is timely, given the publication of the 
2014 Myners Report,4 as well as the ongoing market survey conducted by the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA),5 both of which seek to review the current price formation process 
in the UK. 
This paper begins by providing an overview of the UK IPO and price formation process. 
Following this, Section B analyses the benefits present in the current bookbuilding mechanism. 
Section C continues the analysis by identifying the problems associated with the UK 
bookbuilding system. In particular, it focuses on conflicts of interest that may arise during the 
bookbuilding process. Throughout both Sections, comparisons are drawn with an auction 
system where appropriate. Finally, Section D proposes regulatory reforms in the area of 
bookbuilding and Section E draws some conclusions. 
1. Overview of the IPO process 
The IPO market, also known as the primary market, is a platform where companies offer shares 
to the public on a stock exchange for the first time. A company goes public for various reasons. 
Most obviously, an IPO provides the company with access to capital growth, giving them the 
ability to raise funds, either at the time of flotation, or later, to reduce gearing, raise working 
capital or to fund acquisitions and new initiatives. An IPO also heightens the company’s public 
profile, which helps to attract customers in product markets. Other benefits of an IPO include 
increased liquidity with public securities, which provides greater scope for the company to 
offer employees remuneration packages including shares and options, hence encouraging 
employees’ commitment. 
The IPO process can be divided into four phases.6 The first phase involves organising 
and identifying the motives and goals for going public. The second phase deals with pre-IPO 
preparations. This includes the appointment of advisors, negotiations, due diligence, valuation 
of assets and preparation of marketing materials. The next phase is the marketing phase. Both 
pre-marketing (which is applicable in some countries) and the price formation process are 
central to the marketing phase. There are three types of pricing mechanisms: fixed-price 
offerings, standard auctions, and the bookbuilding. In the last phase, also known as the closing 
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period, the prospectus and the offer price are finalised, and allocations of shares take place 
before the offering is finally placed on the stock exchange and an IPO/flotation takes place. 
The price formation process is key to the IPO. From the company’s (also known as the issuing 
firm) perspective, the process is crucial as it determines, among other things, if an optimal 
initial offer price could be attained. A high initial offer price allows the company to raise more 
capital without the need to issue more shares, which would reduce the stakes held by existing 
shareholders. At the same time, the offering should not be mispriced or overpriced, and the 
initial offer price should be set at a small discount to the future market price in order to generate 
sufficient interest and demand in the shares. In addition, factors other than price, such as 
shareholder base and initial discounts, may also be important objectives. From the market and 
the regulators’ perspectives, attaining an appropriate offer price is fundamental to a deep and 
liquid market. Importantly, the price formation process should also fulfil general market 
objectives to be ‘fair, efficient and transparent’.7 In other words, a well-functioning price 
formation process should be one that guards against improper trading activities and allows 
investors fair access to market facilities, markets, and price information. An optimal price 
discovery in the price formation process is also essential to attain market efficiency. Lastly, 
transparency is vital to realise a fair and efficient price formation process.8 
The underwriter, which is typically an investment bank, plays a crucial role in the IPO 
process. The role of an underwriter includes advising the issuing firm on the type of security 
and its pricing, information gathering, marketing the issue to investors, and completing the 
necessary paperwork. 
2. UK Bookbuilding 
The UK price formation process starts in the pre-marketing phase. In the UK and Europe, 
interactions between investors and the investment bank are common. This is unlike the US, 
which prohibits any test-the-waters communication of an offering prior to the prospectus being 
approved by the Securities Exchange Commission,9 subject to exceptions.10 The purpose of the 
pre-marketing period is to aid in price discovery of fair prices for the offering, by providing 
indications of the initial price range. They also help to build relations with potential key 
                                               
7  International Organization of Securities Commissions (‘IOSCO’), ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation’ (OICV-IOSCO 2010)  
<https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf> accessed 15 July 2015. 
8 David Lawton, ‘Price: the cornerstone of markets’ (International Capital Market Lecture Series 2014, FCA, 3 
February 2014) <http://www.fca.org.uk/news/price-the-cornerstone-of-markets> accessed 15 July 2015. 
9 Securities Act 1933, §5(c); Securities Act Release No. 3844 (Oct 8, 1957). 
10 Eg Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 2012, §105. 
Building a Better Bookbuilding System – An Examination of the UK’s Bookbuilding Regime 
and Proposed Reforms 
242 
investors early on.11 While pre-marketing can take place either through pilot fishing or anchor 
marketing, the UK adopts the former. The concept of anchor marketing requires a degree of 
commitment by key investors before the IPO is opened for public bidding. On the other hand, 
investors participating in pilot fishing are only required to reveal their interest (in terms of price 
and demand) for underwriters to gauge how the market may respond to an issue.12 An initial 
offering price range will then be set on the basis of the pre-marketing feedback. 
After the initial price range has been set, the official price formation process begins. 
Pre-Big Bang era, that is, prior to the deregulation of the London Stock Exchange, the IPO 
market in the UK operated mainly under a fixed offer price regime.13 Under the regime, the 
issuing firm and its underwriters set a fixed offer price that will not be affected nor adjusted in 
accordance to demand and supply once marketing begins. However, the fixed price regime was 
not the most effective pricing mechanism, as IPOs under the regime suffered from severe 
pricing inaccuracies.14 As a result, the UK began to experiment with the auction pricing method 
during the period between the late 1960s and the early-to-mid-1980s.15  Under an auction 
structure, participants bid for shares in an electronic system, in which allocation principles are 
set down expressly and shares are allocated to the highest bidders. 
Nonetheless, it was ultimately the open-price bookbuilding mechanism, rather than 
auctions, that was dominant in the London Stock Exchange by the 1990s. There are three main 
characteristics that are unique to the UK bookbuilding system, as compared to the two 
aforementioned pricing mechanisms. Firstly, only a few investors will be invited to participate 
in the bookbuilding period, which begins after the price range has been set. Secondly, the 
process allows underwriters, who are also known as ‘bookrunners’ in this process, to build a 
book of demand that facilitates price discovery. Lastly, and pertinent to our discussion, the 
final pricing and allocations of shares are largely left at the discretion of the underwriters. 
 
B. MERITS OF THE UK BOOKBUILDING PROCESS 
1. Information revelation 
The present bookbuilding mechanism is efficient in facilitating primary market price discovery 
for a fair IPO price. Primary market price discovery refers to ‘the degree to which prior 
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expectations regarding the value of the offering […] are revised in accordance to the feedback 
from investors and the market at large before the offer price is set’.16 During the bookbuilding 
period, investors are invited to provide non-binding indications of interests at various prices 
within the advertised price range. Indeed, bookbuilding assumes that investors are more 
knowledgeable about pricing information than issuers or underwriters. Such information 
includes investors’ own demands for the issue, inside information about a competitor that could 
significantly affect the prospects of the issuer and more generally, knowledge of the market’s 
valuation of the offering. 17 Participants of the bookbuilding process are usually a select few 
institutional investors. Retail investors are generally excluded. 
It is submitted that it is precisely this exclusion of retail investors that makes 
bookbuilding an efficient and accurate information-gathering process. It would be extremely 
inefficient, if not infeasible, for the underwriter to invite a large group of small retail investors 
to participate in the bookbuilding process, given the tight timeline of a typical IPO process. 
Furthermore, retail investors are typically less informed and less skilled at valuation when 
compared to professional investors. For instance, individual retail investors tend to overweigh 
personal experiences when making investment decisions.18 Larger corporations are generally 
more resourceful. Thus, it is optimal to limit the price discovery phase to well-informed 
institutional investors. It is interesting to note that, based on a survey conducted by Jenkinson 
and Jones, the quantity of information disclosed by institutional investors does not differ 
significantly between the larger and smaller corporations.19 
In addition, it is further submitted that the present bookbuilding system has the added 
advantage of allowing underwriters to build a book of demand that reflects the expected 
quantity of shares at different prices. The book distinguishes between three types of bids.20 
Firstly, investors may submit a strike bid. A strike bid allows investors to decide only on the 
quantity of shares to purchase, and they will have to accept any issue price up to the top of the 
indicative range. Secondly, investors may opt for a limit bid, whereby they indicate the 
maximum price that they are willing to pay for the quantity demanded. Thirdly, a step bid 
                                               
16 Alexander Ljungqivst and Wlliam J Wilhelm, ‘IPO allocations: discriminatory or discretionary?’ (2002) 65 
Journal of Financial Economics 167, 178. 
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occurs when investors submit a series of limit bids providing precise amounts of demand at 
different prices. Of these, limit bids tend to be the most informative, while strike bids provide 
the least information. It should be noted that a bidder who submitted a strike bid would not 
necessarily be awarded with fewer underpriced shares in the UK. This is due to the fact that 
the particular bidder may have revealed useful information at the earlier pre-marketing phase. 
Accordingly, since the information gathered during bookbuilding will eventually be 
imputed in the secondary market, the bookbuilding process enables the issuer and underwriter 
to estimate future market prices (assuming an efficient market in which the aftermarket shares 
prices would fully reflect all available information).21 Typically, the initial offer price is set at 
a discount to the future market price, in order to generate sufficient interest in the offering. 
Unlike the fixed offer price mechanism, which does not engage investors in any extensive 
discussion with the underwriters prior to fixing the offer price, bookbuilding invites 
information revelation. Consistent with this view, empirical evidence shows that UK IPOs with 
fixed price offerings were more heavily discounted than bookbuilt IPOs for the period of 2004-
2012.22 
Indeed, and perhaps ironically, optimal price discovery is only possible if underpricing 
occurs. Underpricing, which refers to the situation when the first-day closing price of an IPO 
stock is greater in amount/percentage than the offer price,23 is essential in bookbuilding to 
incentivise informed investors to truthfully reveal positive information about the issue. In the 
absence of compensation for information revelation, investors would be tempted to withhold 
information, or actively misrepresent positive information, in order to be able to subscribe at a 
low offer price before subsequently selling the shares in the aftermarket at the higher full-
information price (assuming an efficient capital market). Thus, a certain amount of 
underpricing is necessary to facilitate price discovery, particularly since information collection 
can be costly for investors. In fact, it has become a common market practice to compensate 
investors for information by underpricing, and final offer prices are often partially adjusted in 
accordance with new information and demand. 24  Issues with greater amount of good 
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22 Myners (n 2) 76. 
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information are typically more underpriced than other IPOs. 25  Nevertheless, although 
underpricing results in lost potential capital for the issuer, issuers benefit from the resulting 
information acquisition, which provides an indication of future market prices. Paradoxically, 
the facilitation of price discovery helps to minimise the extent of underpricing. More 
specifically, underpricing that occurs within this context ranges between a low 2 percent and 5 
percent.26 
The foundation underpinning optimal price discovery and minimal underpricing is the 
underwriter’s ability to allocate discretionarily under the present bookbuilding system. With 
discretionary power, preferential allocations can be used to reward truth telling. Conversely, 
any restrictions on the underwriter’s discretion to allocate shares to more informed investors 
(for example, by regulating a specific portion of allocation to retail investors) may result in 
greater reliance on underpricing to aggregate information from less informed investors. As 
Ljungqivst puts it, ‘underpricing all shares by $1 but skewing allocations so that co-operative 
investors reap most of the underpricing profits is preferable to having to underprice all shares 
by $2 to generate the same dollar reward for co-operative investors on smaller allocations’.27 
In other words, discretionary allocation is vital for the efficiency of the pricing mechanism and 
for an optimal initial offer price to be realised simultaneously. 
2. Advantages of discretionary allocation 
The underwriter’s discretion on share allocation is desirable to the extent that it is used in favour 
of the issuer, which would allow the IPO and its final allocation to be aligned with the issuing 
firm’s long run business objectives. For instance, the issuer may have a particular preference 
to spread the ownership of shares widely, for reasons associated with increased liquidity, or to 
retain control in the company.28 In such a case, the underwriter can exercise its allocation 
discretion to favour investors who demand a smaller number of shares. The issuer may also 
have preferences over the nationality of its investors, depending on the nature of the issuing 
firm. For example, larger firms with low risks tend to prefer international investors to, inter 
alia, reap the price advantages of a global IPO and broaden the shareholders base.29 Empirical 
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evidence collected by Jenkinson, Jones and Suntheim also suggests that underwriters exercise 
their discretion to the benefit of issuers, by allocating shares to long-term investors, away from 
‘flippers’ who are likely to depress aftermarket share prices.30 
3. Auctions 
By way of contrast, optimal price discovery is unlikely to occur in an auction system. Under 
the auction system, the underwriter has little or no control over pricing and shares allocation to 
cater to the need to compensate investors for information revelation. This leads to moral 
hazards and free rider problems. Moral hazard problems occur due to the presence of perverse 
incentives for irresponsible risk-taking.31 This is particularly evident in the case of Dutch 
auctions and uniform price auctions, where bidding will only determine the final allocations 
and the offer price is uniform for all bidders. Consequently, new bidders will be enticed to 
‘free-ride’ by following high bids without conducting their own valuations, on the presumption 
that other bidders would have collected the necessary information. The effect of free-riding by 
some investors means that other investors will also be less incentivised to collect information, 
since there will be no readily effective way of charging for free-riding. As a result, the auction 
pricing process becomes less efficient and mispricing occurs. 
Accordingly, this paper respectfully disagrees with the position taken in the Myners 
Report that the use of auctions can ensure maximum price discovery. The Myners Report 
contends that since investors bid what they are each willing to pay and since auctions are ‘more 
transparent’, no discretionary price adjustment takes place and an auction reveals the true 
demand curve. 32 However, as pointed out in the previous paragraph, the information revealed 
in an auction system may not reflect an accurate level of future demand due to free-riding 
issues. In contrast, the discretion provided by the bookbuilding system can be especially 
beneficial for the issuing firm, provided the underwriter exercises its discretionary power 
appropriately. Coupled with the benefits of optimal price discovery and minimal underpricing, 
the bookbuilding mechanism leads to a highly efficient price formation process, and is 
therefore desirable from both the issuer and the market’s viewpoint. 
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C. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Unfortunately, the efficiency of the price formation process may be hindered by problems 
associated with conflicts of interest. Whilst the aforementioned advantages of the bookbuilding 
mechanism assume that the underwriter’s interests are fully aligned to those of the issuing firm, 
this is often not the case in practice due to the potential for conflicts of interest. It follows that, 
although the bookbuilding mechanism may be used in favour of the issuer, it can also 
exacerbate the inherent agency problems between the underwriter and the issuer, and hence 
work to the latter’s disadvantage. At this point, it is important to note that the underwriter’s 
discretionary power on shares allocation and pricing does not per se lead to conflicts of interest; 
rather, it is the lack of transparency associated with this discretion that is the root of the 
problem.  
1. Conflicts of interest: underwriters and issuers 
The issue of conflicts of interest is particularly problematic, as it frustrates all market objectives 
of fairness, efficiency, and transparency. If conflicts of interest become severe, bookbuilding 
will lead to excessive underpricing. In such cases, bookbuilding will cease to be the optimal 
route to price discovery.33 From the issuer’s perspective, conflicts of interest can be detrimental 
in two ways. Firstly, underpricing implies a transfer of wealth from existing owners to new 
investors, and that equity raising has not been maximised for the issuing firm. More 
specifically, Jenkinson and Suntheim suggest that the value of the IPO may be maximised to 
specific investor clients of underwriters.34 Despite this, it is interesting to observe that issuers 
are generally less concerned with excessive underpricing, insofar as it nevertheless results in 
an overall increase in wealth,35 and if underpricing is accompanied by a reputable underwriting 
firm. 36  Regardless, it is certain that issuing firms will not reject a situation in which 
underpricing is minimised (if all other factors remain constant). Secondly, misallocations of 
shares that result from conflicts of interest may run counter to IPO objectives, and the firm’s 
continuing business strategy. 
There are two areas of conflict in the context of bookbuilding. One potential area 
pertains to pricing. Ideally, underwriters ought to recommend an offer price in accordance with 
the information gathered during the bookbuilding process. The price will be set at a level where 
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demand exceeds supply,37 in the best interests of the issuing firm, as mentioned. In reality 
however, this may not always occur, as a result of misalignment of interests between the 
underwriter and the issuing firm. Conflicts of interest may arise either as a conflict between the 
firm’s interests and its duty to its customers (interest-duty), or due to conflicting duties owed 
to different customers (duty-duty).38 
Most fundamentally, underwriters owe duties to both issuers and investors. As a result, 
they are often required to strike a balance between both parties’ desires to achieve profit 
maximisation, as reiterated by the FCA,39 through high offer prices for issuers and underpriced 
shares for investors (ie duty-duty conflicts of interest). Since the underwriter has to be 
accountable to both parties, alongside the lack of transparency in its discretionary power, it is 
inevitable that the ultimate offer price will not be the highest possible. Indeed, it is submitted 
that investment banks may be more biased towards institutional investors, resulting in a greater 
tendency to underprice. This is in light of the long-term relationships between underwriters and 
many institutional investors. These investors often return to purchase shares from the same 
underwriter, in whom they have established trust. On the other hand, issuers are likely to have 
only temporary relationships with investment banks, as it is not likely that they will list the 
company’s shares more than once. 40  Even where there is no existing long-term business 
relationship, an increase in payouts to hedge funds and other large investors can help 
underwriters develop yet another group of loyal investors for future issues.41 
In addition, misalignment of incentives can also arise due to conflicting interests 
between the issuing firm’s profit maximisation goal and the underwriter’s immediate concerns 
(interest-duty conflicts of interest). In particular, the problem of interest-duty conflicts will be 
trickier than duty-duty conflicts, given that the underwriter’s fundamental interests will be 
directly affected. For instance, the issuer’s desire to maximise capital raising is at odds with 
the underwriter’s primary concern to minimise selling efforts for the offering. When 
contracting with issuers, underwriters use either a firm commitment underwriting, or best 
efforts underwriting. In a best efforts underwriting, an underwriter agrees to a fee for its best 
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efforts to sell the issue, with the issuer bearing risks of the shares not selling quickly, or not 
selling at all. In a firm commitment underwriting, the underwriter agrees to purchase a fixed 
number of shares from the issuer at a discount before selling them to investors.42 As the latter 
is more commonly used in the UK, it will be further discussed here. 
By purchasing the whole offering in a firm commitment underwriting, underwriters 
assume the risk of an unsuccessful offering. An issue that does not sell gives rise to both direct 
and indirect costs. Crucially, any unsold shares, or shares that do not sell quickly may adversely 
affect future businesses. If the shares are not fully sold, the underwriting firm may suffer from 
reputational harm among issuers, resulting in the loss of future issues to underwrite.43 Investors 
may also be less willing to purchase future shares that are underwritten by the firm, since unsold 
shares may reflect poor judgments by underwriters on the offering.44 Since one of the main 
advantages of bookbuilding is also the fact that issuers are able to capitalise on the existing 
relationships between the underwriter and its regular investors, ensuring a minimum demand 
for the offering, it is likely that underwriters will receive fewer desirable offerings as the 
underwriter-investor relationships worsen, thereby triggering a vicious cycle. Therefore, to 
ensure a minimum level of demand, underwriters may underprice to create a large spread 
between the offering price and the anticipated aftermarket price, since investors will be enticed 
to purchase shares that will certainly have a price rise. Admittedly, this may not always be the 
case. After all, since raising offer prices maximises underwriting fees, underwriters also have 
clear financial incentives to obtain high offer prices. As such, it is when the risks of an 
unsuccessful offering outweigh the additional gains from increasing offer prices that 
underwriters will resort to substantial underpricing that is contrary to the issuer’s goal to 
maximise profits. In other words, any benefits obtained by issuers in bookbuilding appear to 
be more coincidental than conscious attempts by the underwriter to pursue the issuing firm’s 
interests. 
The second potential area of conflict is allocation. Given numerous profit-seeking 
considerations (for instance, extra commissions), it is also probable that underwriters will use 
their discretionary powers for their own benefits. As a result, shares allocation may not be 
aligned with the issuing firm’s desired pool of investors. Indeed, FCA’s research findings 
suggest that allocation decisions may reflect the interest of the banks,45 and ‘[underwriters] 
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often favour their prime brokerage and hedge fund clients when allocating the shares in an IPO, 
which may not be in the interests of the issuer’.46 In addition, separate research on European 
investment firms also found that the broking relationship with the underwriter is perceived to 
be the most influential factor in determining share allocations. 47  Empirical evidence also 
suggests that underwriters are often incentivised to allocate shares based on commissions 
received, and not necessarily according to the issuer’s best interests.48 
The lack of transparency of the underwriter’s discretion in relation to shares allocation 
may also further aggravate underpricing. A case in point is the relation between allocation and 
commissions received. Institutional investors often engage in rent-seeking behaviour to 
compete for allocations of underpriced shares, and one way to do so is to offer underwriters 
excessive commission rates.49 Although underwriters have financial incentives to obtain high 
prices (as mentioned), conflicts arise when compensations obtained for money left on the table 
(ie the first-day price gain multiplied by the number of shares sold) 50  outweigh direct 
underwriting fees received from issuing firms. This is possible since issuers generally appear 
to view opportunity costs in the form of money left on the table as less than the direct costs 
underwriting fees. For example, while $18.87 million were left on the table, only $3.66 million 
direct fees were paid in the 1986 Microsoft IPO.51 Similarly, the amount left on the table in the 
2011 LinkedIn IPO was approximately ten times the underwriting fees paid.52 Arguably, this 
may be due to the fact that neither of these costs is reflected in the issuing firm’s income 
statements, hence resulting in misjudgements of costs. 53  In fact, a study conducted by 
Ljungqvist shows that a one percent increase in direct underwriting fees reduces underpricing 
by 11 percent in the UK. 
Other examples include laddering and spinning. Laddering refers to the practice of 
allocating underpriced shares to institutional investors who agree to purchase additional shares 
in the aftermarket at a higher price.54 The effect of laddering is an artificial increase in demand, 
                                               
46 FCA, ‘Wholesale sector competition review 2014-15’ (FCA 2015) 17. 
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49 FCA ‘Market Study Investment and corporate banking market study Interim report’ (n 45); Jonathan Reuter, 
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allocations?’ (2007) 84 Journal of Financial Economics 87, 108. 
50 Loughran and Ritter (n 35) 413. 
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which leads to the rise of aftermarket share prices. When underwriters profit from these 
investors’ extra earnings through high commissions, laddering provides additional value to 
underwriters and underpricing increases. Spinning refers to the market practice of shares being 
sold by specific individual investors immediately in the aftermarket for a quick profit. More 
specifically, shares may be allocated to corporate managers of both public and/or private 
companies for a quick ‘spin’ and these individuals benefit at the expense of pre-existing 
shareholders, whose shares are diluted as a result of underpricing, on top of an increased 
number of shares. Therein also lie problems between the principals and agents within the 
issuing firm, but which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Although conflicts of interest may be mitigated with efficient and effective monitoring 
efforts, this can be difficult to achieve in a bookbuilding regime as a result of information 
asymmetries and financial sophistication. As the main administrators of the bookbuilding 
process, underwriters have complete control of the information gathered during the process. 
This gives them a significant informational advantage over the issuer, thus undermining the 
issuer’s ability to monitor the underwriter. 55 In particular, the greater the ex ante uncertainty 
of the firm’s value, the greater the informational asymmetry between the issuer and the 
underwriter. Since the underwriter has more price-relevant information than the issuer, it is 
likely to create imbalance during pricing negotiations with the issuing firm. 56  This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the pricing data are often presented in a complex and sophisticated 
form that the issuer is incapable of understanding.57 Similarly, given that the allocation criteria 
are not expressly set out, monitoring efforts in relation to whether the interests of the issuer are 
considered for shares allocation can be difficult and time consuming.58 
2. The legal framework 
In light of the undesirable consequences of conflicts of interest, the following parts of this 
Section analyse if the issue of conflicts of interest has been adequately controlled under the 
current legal regime. 
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a) Common law 
The English common law position on the issue of whether the relationship between 
underwriters and issuing firms during an IPO price formation process is fiduciary in nature has 
yet to be established. This is arguably attributed to the FCA’s extensive rule-making powers, 
which have resulted in the substantive law being largely contained in regulatory rules, rather 
than in statutes, and hence ‘stunt[ed] the growth of common law’.59 The underwriter-issuer 
relationship does not fall within the well-recognised categories of fiduciary duty under English 
law (ie trustees, directors, agents, business partners).60 Thus far, there is also no case law that 
directly addresses the character of the underwriter-issuer relationship. The only case that comes 
close to the issue is United Pan-Europe v Deutsche Bank,61 in which Deutsche Bank was found 
to owe fiduciary obligations to a firm to which it had loaned funds. However, the argument on 
fiduciary obligations was not made on the basis that Deutsche Bank took on the role of an 
underwriter in the firm’s IPO a year before. The judicial position on the underwriter-issuer 
relationship therefore remains unanswered. 
In theory, an underwriter acting in the capacity of a financial advisor in the context of 
the IPO price formation process is capable of being a fiduciary. A fiduciary refers to ‘someone 
who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another […] in circumstances which give rise to 
a relationship of trust and confidence’.62 It therefore follows that fiduciary obligations may be 
imposed in commercial circumstances where a party relies upon financial advice provided by 
an investment bank, which is acting in its capacity as a financial/corporate advisor.63 Such 
circumstances would clearly include situations when the underwriter undertakes the role of a 
financial advisor during the price formation process to advise on issues such as the design, 
pricing, and timing of the offering. Countervailing arguments that the underwriter cannot be 
deemed to be in a position of power and influence over the issuing firm, given the latter’s 
financial sophistication, are unpersuasive. As discussed in subsection 1 above, issuing firms 
often lack the relevant expertise and knowledge as to market demand and financial data in 
relation to pricing the IPO. The underwriter-issuer relationship can therefore fall within the 
definition of fiduciary obligations. 
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Nonetheless, the English courts have been reluctant to impose fiduciary obligations on 
a commercial relationship, as the parties to a transaction are deemed to have had sufficient 
opportunities to prescribe obligations and remedies through negotiations and, more 
importantly, so as to ensure commercial certainty.64 This is especially since fiduciary duties 
can be modified or excluded under contractual law, subject to the ‘good faith’ test under 
Regulation 4(1) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.65 Furthermore, 
both the issuing firm and the underwriters in an IPO are sophisticated parties. Thus, it appears 
unlikely that the English courts will follow the New York case of EBC I Inc v Goldman Sachs 
& Co, where it was held that although fiduciary duties do not typically exist in the underwriter-
issuer relationship, advising the issuer on pricing the IPO can be sufficient to impose a fiduciary 
duty.66 It will likely be an uphill struggle for a party to claim before the English courts that a 
fiduciary relationship has arisen in such circumstances. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the courts should take a more lenient approach when 
determining fiduciary obligations of underwriters within the circumstances of an IPO price 
formation process.67 Instead of relying solely on FCA regulations (as will be discussed below), 
the common law provides an additional form of enforcement by issuing firms and other market 
participants, and hence encourages greater monitoring by market participants. This might 
provide greater deterrence to inappropriate pricing and allocations, thus achieving greater 
fairness, efficiency, and transparency. However, due to the fact that the courts will interpret the 
common law in accordance with the regulatory rules when there is an inconsistency between 
the two, it will be of limited practical significance even if fiduciary obligations are enforced. 
This is especially so with regard to conflicts of interest, where there are several inconsistencies 
between common law and the FCA regulatory rules. Whilst common law requires fiduciaries 
to avoid any conflicts of interest, Principle 8 of the FCA Principles for Business (PRIN) and 
chapter 10 of the FCA’s Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls Sourcebook 
(SYSC) only expect investment firms to manage such conflicts of interest. Under section 2.3 
of the FCA Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS), exceptions to the ‘no inducement’ rule 
are narrow, whereas under the common law, the fiduciary may receive a wide range of benefits 
if its client specifically agrees to it. In such circumstances, the English courts will ‘attach 
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considerable weight’ to regulations,68 and underwriters are unlikely to be liable under fiduciary 
law if they abide by the FCA regulatory rules. This also means that, in any case, any fiduciary 
duty that may be owed by an underwriter will not differ substantially from what is stipulated 
in the FCA regulations. This renders any debate on whether fiduciary obligations should be 
imposed on underwriters to be of little significance.69 Accordingly, as the English courts are 
generally reluctant to interfere with a commercial relationship, and as the common law duties 
will be interpreted in accordance to contractual law and regulatory rules, it is submitted that 
the FCA regulations are particularly crucial for regulating the issue of conflicts of interest 
between the underwriter and the issuer in the price formation process. 
b) The regulatory framework 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) confers wide-ranging rule-making 
powers on the FCA.70 The main regulations that are relevant for our purposes are the Rules and 
Guidance provided in PRIN, COBS and chapter 10 of the SYSC. The primary advantage of the 
FCA regulations is that, unlike the exclusion clauses that are allowed under common law, and 
subject to exceptions, COBS 2.1.2R forbids a firm to exclude or restrict any duty or liability it 
has to a client under the FCA regulations. The guidance in COBS 2.1.3G qualifies COBS 
2.1.1R by providing that exclusions or restrictions may be allowed if they are ‘honest, fair and 
professional for [the firm] to do so’, emphasising COBS 2.1.1R to act ‘honestly, fairly and 
professionally’ in its client’s best interests. This helps to ensure that fairness is maintained in 
the markets.  
In relation to IPO allocations, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (the predecessor 
of the FCA) established that the acceptance of extra commissions and the market practices of 
laddering and spinning would be in breach of COBS 2.3.1R, which prohibits the 
offer/acceptance of commissions that are likely to conflict with the duty owed to customers.71 
Yet it is unclear if these provisions sufficiently deter improper trading activities to ensure 
fairness in the IPO markets. Although the FSA found no clear evidence of exploitations in their 
own research findings, they identified ‘anomalies in share price movements’ and there were 
also ‘suspicions of unsatisfactory practices’.72 In addition, the fact that firms retain minimal 
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records on their IPO allocations is one reason to be cautious about the FSA’s modest 
assessment of the real level of abuse.73 
More generally, investment banks have an overarching obligation to ‘manage conflicts 
of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another 
client’.74  Chapter 10 of the SYSC sets out specific requirements to disclose and manage 
conflicts of interest. In particular, SYSC 10.1.15G states that the underwriter: 
might wish to consider […] agreeing […] with [the issuer …] what recommendations 
[the underwriter] will make about the allocations for the offering; how the target 
investor group will be identified; how recommendations on allocation and pricing will 
be prepared; and whether the firm might place securities with its investment clients […] 
and allocation and pricing objectives.75 
It is noteworthy that SYSC 10.1.15G is the only provision in the FCA Handbooks that directly 
addresses the issue of pricing and allocation in an IPO. Discussing pricing and allocation 
strategies openly with the issuing firms improves transparency through timely supply of the 
relevant information, thus keeping in check potential abuses of conflicts of interests. 
Furthermore, an open communication process helps issuers to assess pricing and allocation 
recommendations, especially when allocation is made to the bank or its affiliate, and therefore 
ensures that the outcome of an IPO will be to their best interests. From the market’s perspective, 
it is also more likely that information will be reflected in the final initial price, and hence SYSC 
10.1.15G potentially aids in achieving the market objectives of fairness, efficiency and 
transparency. Nevertheless, the wording of SYSC 10.1.15G (‘might wish to consider’) 
indicates that the rule does not impose a strict obligation on the underwriter. This is affirmed 
by the status of the provision as ‘Guidance’ under the FCA Sourcebook. In other words, the 
provision is not binding, and underwriters will not incur disciplinary liability just because they 
did not follow the provision.76 As such, it is doubtful whether the SYSC requirement actually 
goes beyond providing mere guidance to have any practical implications towards achieving 
market objectives, especially in relation to ‘individuals who have no principles’.77 
                                               
73 ibid. 
74 FCA Handbook, Principles of Business 2.1. 
75 FCA Handbook, Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls Sourcebook 10.1.15G. 
76 FCA, ‘Reader’s Guide: an introduction to the Handbook’ (FCA 2013) 24. 
77 Hector Sants, ‘Delivering Intensive Supervision and Credible Deterrence’ (Speech delivered at the Reuters 
Newsmaker Event, 12 March 2009) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml> accessed 5 August 2015. 
Building a Better Bookbuilding System – An Examination of the UK’s Bookbuilding Regime 
and Proposed Reforms 
256 
In addition to this, the FCA provisions that apply to the IPO pricing process and 
underwriters in general are limited, as laid out in COBS 18.3.1. The FCA also suggests that 
some rules are unlikely to apply in such circumstances, the most notable being the best 
execution rule under COBS 11.2.1R, which is central to the European Union Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive I (MiFID I). 78  Circumstances that give rise to proscribed 
conflicts of interest are also relatively limited. According to SYSC 10.1.5G, conflicts of interest 
do not occur when loss has not been caused to the client, or a client has not earned at the 
expense of another client. However, as explained at the start of this Section, the presence of 
conflicts of interest is itself detrimental to achieving all market objectives of fairness, 
efficiency, and transparency. It is therefore submitted that the existence of a conflict of interest 
and the action of the underwriter should be allowed to qualify as proscribed conflicts of interest 
under the SYSC. 
An overall assessment of the FCA regulations further demonstrates that the current UK 
regulatory framework is unsatisfactory in advancing market aims. Firstly, the effectiveness of 
the FCA’s enforcement remains to be seen. Although it has been ten years since the regulations 
on conflicts of interest were reviewed,79 there has yet to be any sanction on underwriters with 
regards their failure to manage conflicts of interest during the IPO process. Indeed, a lack of 
formal enforcement action does not necessarily imply or lead to a lower level of compliance, 
particularly since formal enforcement actions are only one of the regulatory tools that the FCA 
relies on to deal with contravention.80 However, there is also no evidence to suggest that a high 
level of compliance has been achieved. Apart from the aforementioned suspected activities in 
relation to laddering and spinning, research by the FCA in 2014 continues to suggest that biased 
allocations potentially occur in practice.81 The London Stock Exchange’s survey findings in 
2011 also found that ‘95 percent of investors do not trust banks when they are pricing and 
allocating IPOs, or want more transparency from them’.82 Hence, it is questionable if much 
compliance has been attained. The lack of enforcement in this area therefore indicates that the 
regulation has been more bark than bite. Indeed, the unsatisfactory level of enforcement does 
not seem to be confined to the sphere of underwriting in the pricing process. A recent sanction 
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on an asset management firm for breach of PRIN 8 by the FCA came only after eight years of 
the firm’s failure to manage conflicts of interest fairly.83  
Secondly, even if underwriters were to be sanctioned for the failure to manage conflicts 
of interest, issuers are unlikely to be able to claim against loss under the FCA regulatory rules. 
This is because only some regulations are actionable under section 138D of FSMA. For 
instance, both SYSC 10 and PRIN, which are the main provisions for managing conflicts of 
interest, are not actionable. Breaching a Principle only makes a firm liable to FCA disciplinary 
sanctions and it does not give rise to any private claims for loss.84 This means that issuers 
cannot be compensated for any loss that results from exploitations of conflicts of interest. In 
this regard, PRIN 8 does not sufficiently protect the issuers’ interests. In addition, although ‘a 
private person’ may, pursuant to section 138D of FSMA, sue an investment bank who has 
caused them a loss through a breach of the FCA rules, this right is extremely limited. To obtain 
standing for the claim, the claimant must be ‘a private person’ (as defined in the Right of Action 
Regulations)85 and corporate persons may only rely on the provision if they are not ‘conducting 
business of any kind’. 86  In Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc, a steel 
manufacturer who was sold inappropriate swaps by a bank was held to be conducting business 
even though it was not experienced in financial markets, and was therefore unable to rely on 
section 138D of FSMA.87 As such, it could be difficult for an issuing firm to rely on section 
138D of FSMA for a claim for loss. Furthermore, section 151 of FSMA provides that no 
contravention of an FCA rule makes any transaction void or unenforceable. Hence, it is 
submitted that the present regulatory framework does not provide sufficient sanctions and 
remedies to deter and correct cases where the market objectives of fairness, efficiency, and 
transparency have been foiled. 
The inadequacy of the current regime is further illustrated by the fact that the same issue 
remains one of concern years after the review of the regulations in relation to conflicts of 
interest in 2003, as well as the incorporation of MiFID I in 2007. This is evinced in the FCA’s 
2015 Market Study to address transparency issues during the allocation process, 88 a 2014 
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independent review on IPO and Bookbuilding, 89  as well as enhanced transparency 
requirements in the amended MiFiD I (MiFID II), due to take effect in the UK in 2017.90  
3. Auctions 
On the other hand, auctions set down all allocation criteria explicitly and allocations take place 
under an automated system. These pre-defined allocation principles leave underwriters with 
little discretion on the allocation of shares and leads to a greater likelihood that the final 
allocation and pricing will be in the issuer’s interests. The increased transparency may therefore 
render auctions more desirable to bookbuildings, whereby allocations are decided behind the 
door. However, such transparency also comes at the expense of discretion in allocations and 
pricing, as aforementioned, which greatly impedes an efficient price formation process. In 
addition, an auction system is also risky because of unpredictable future demand. Wide 
variations in the number of bidders per auction are common. In Singapore for example, the 
number of bidder can vary from 1,128 to 162,492 in different auctions. 91 As a result, there is 
an increased possibility of the offering being undersubscribed. Indeed, in the 2004 Google IPO, 
the issuer was forced to lower the price range due to a lack of demand at the original price 
range.92 On the other hand, there is more control over future demands in bookbuildings, as 
investors who are invited to take part in the bookbuilding process will most likely take up the 
offering. 
Crucially, the auction system has not worked well in practice. This can be illustrated by 
the 2004 Google IPO. According to the Myners Report, allocation criteria can be built into the 
auction system to mitigate the aforementioned problems.93 This is indeed what Google sought 
to achieve, by including the right to reserve the right to price below market-clearing, the right 
to throw out excessively high bids that it considered speculative, and limiting the maximum 
possible number of bidders, which essentially eliminates free-riders from bidding. However, 
despite Google having controlled certain aspects of the IPO, the value and size outcomes were 
still substantially below expectations and did not meet Google’s original objectives. The level 
of underpricing was also relatively high, at 18 percent.94 
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Thus, whilst the UK bookbuilding mechanism suffers from the problem of a lack of 
transparency in respect of the underwriter’s discretionary powers, giving rise to potential 
abuses, this does not necessarily indicate that the bookbuilding mechanism should be radically 
replaced with an auction system. Although the enhanced transparency of an auction system 
removes the problem of conflicts of interest in its entirety, it introduces other problems such as 
uncertainty and an inefficient price discovery process. Ultimately, given that a further analysis 
on the present UK legal regime reveals that the issue of transparency remains a concern, it is 
suggested that the present UK bookbuilding system should be retained but with the regulatory 
improvements proposed in Section D below. These improvements are required as, while the 
significance of the common law has been greatly reduced due to the FCA’s extensive regulatory 
powers, the FCA regulations remain limited in addressing issues pertaining to conflicts of 
interest. This is as a result of the discretionary nature of the regulations, its narrow scope, and 
the lack of both public and private enforcement. 
 
D. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Disclosure of allocation criteria 
This paper contends that an optimal pricing mechanism is one that combines both the merits of 
the bookbuilding and auction structure. Specifically, it should enhance the transparency of the 
pricing and allocation process and, at the same time, retain a certain degree of discretion on the 
underwriter’s part in order to facilitate price discovery. Above all, an optimal IPO mechanism 
is one that exhibits ‘fairness, efficiency and transparency’.95 Consequently, the first part of this 
Section rejects Australian Bookbuilding (ASX Bookbuilding) that has been ‘strongly 
encouraged’ in the Myners Report,96 before proceeding to propose an alternative system that 
better balances the concurrent needs for discretion and transparency. 
a) ASX Bookbuilding 
ASX Bookbuilding was introduced by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 2013. ASX 
Bookbuilding aims to, inter alia, improve transparency and efficiency of the IPO process, while 
enabling issuers and lead managers to retain sufficient control over pricing and allocation 
decisions.97 Under ASX Bookbuilding, the issuer and its lead manager first decide on the 
preliminary deal parameters, including the total allocation amount and identifying preferred 
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investors to invite ‘priority bids’ from those investors. After collecting the priority bids, ASX 
Bookbuilding opens. All eligible investors may bid and a live bid price (but not market depth 
or volume) is visible to all bidders. 
This enhances the transparency of pricing outcomes, which reduces conflicts of interest. 
At the same time, the issuer and the lead manager are able to see the number and depth of bids 
and can adjust the parameters, such as the proportion of priority bidders as versus on-market 
bidders, according to their desired commercial outcomes. Some discretionary powers are 
thereby retained. It is also worth noting that ASX Bookbuilding has been openly endorsed by 
the Myners Report as an option to improve the transparency of the UK price formation process, 
although it was only mentioned in passing.98 
A closer look at the innovative ASX mechanism however reveals several flaws. ASX 
Bookbuilding establishes a fixed set of rules for shares allocations that are to be applied in 
every IPO. Priority bidders with bids placed at or above the final bookbuild price receive a 
priority allocation. This is followed by the price leader allocation phase, which rewards price 
leaders for contributing to the price discovery. The remaining shares are allocated to bids that 
are priced above the final offer price on a pro-rata basis. 
Prima facie, the price leader allocation phase may facilitate price discovery. However, 
it is doubtful if such allocation would in fact aid in ensuring an optimal initial price. The 
mechanism does not enable issuers to differentiate between informed and uninformed on-
market-bids. Whilst some bidders may have conducted detailed professional valuation and 
analysis on the issuing firm, others may be free-riders (as detailed above in Section B.3). In 
other words, the demand curve obtained through ASX Bookbuilding may only appear accurate 
on the surface, as compared to the bookbuilding regime. 
As much as ASX Bookbuilding provides some discretion in identifying ‘priority 
bidders’, the issuer does not have any discretion to reduce allocation to any specific bidders. 
The presence of these standard allocation rules limits the issuer’s capacity to deter bids that 
may harm the company. Furthermore, the standard allocation principles focus only on whether 
the bids are placed at or above the final bookbuilding price and the qualities of the bids (for 
example, whether the investor will be a long-term holder) are beyond consideration. 99 
Although this may suggest that the allocation process is fair, it also means that the issuer will 
be oblivious to any short-sellers and bidders who do not have the tendency to maintain 
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allocations. The identities of the on-market bidders are also anonymous to the issuer and the 
system does not allow the issuer to have regard to a bidder’s history of market behaviour in 
making allocations. 100  It could be maintained that ASX Bookbuilding provides sufficient 
control over preferential investors by allowing issuers to select priority bidders. However, it is 
as important to enable issuers to remove bidders of low quality where they deem fit, particularly 
given the strong emphasis that listed companies place on ensuring the quality of share 
registers.101 
ASX Bookbuilding, unlike what its title suggests, is in fact premised on an auction 
system. This foundation however, as seen in the previous sections, is fundamentally deficient. 
Coupled with the fact that ASX Bookbuilding limits discretion and price discovery, a better 
model should be one that is based on the bookbuilding mechanism, which is better able to 
provide a good equilibrium between both discretion and transparency. 
b) Proposed disclosure requirements 
The proposed system retains the current bookbuilding model as its core, while incorporating 
new disclosure requirements (hereby referred as modified bookbuilding). Through the 
underwriters’ discretion in allocation in the traditional bookbuilding system, issuing firms will 
not only be able to consider the prices of bids, but also ensure their qualities. After all, an IPO 
is a complex process, which requires companies to achieve a balance between many competing 
factors. Accordingly, a well-functioning IPO mechanism should also offer flexibility and 
discretion for companies to attain both their IPO objectives and commercial goals in the long-
run. 
Nonetheless, the traditional bookbuilding system has to be modified for greater 
transparency. More specifically, while ensuring discretion in allocations, mandatory disclosure 
regarding allocation criteria should be enforced. Currently, the sole regulation that comes close 
to this is SYSC 10.1.15G, which only provides for an optional regime to conduct a discussion 
between the issuer and underwriters with regard pricing and allocation criteria. However, these 
allocation criteria should in fact be expressly agreed upon and set out at the early stage of the 
IPO process, rather than being deployed in private meetings. Such criteria may include the 
amount of positive information provided for pricing the issue, the probability of the investor 
being a long-term holder and the investor’s willingness to place early bids.102 In particular, 
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these allocation principles should be ‘well-understood criteria that can be inferred with 
reasonable confidence from investors’ past behaviour’.103 Any principle that is applied but not 
commonly used in the market must be clearly justified. 
Since the assessment of various yardsticks remains highly subjective, it is also 
suggested that the issuer and its underwriter are required to rank the different allocation criteria 
according to the issuer’s preference. For instance, stability may be most crucial in light of the 
issuer’s circumstances and, in such a case, the need for long-term holders will be more 
important than whether the investor is willing to place early bids. Indeed, it may be arbitrary 
to categorise the different criteria so distinctly and investors should be judged as a whole to 
determine suitability. Thus, an appropriate compromise would be to establish different tiers of 
criteria according to their levels of importance and each tier may consist of a few allocation 
principles. 
Admittedly, the modified bookbuilding structure may limit the underwriter’s discretion 
to a small extent. However, this does not impede price discovery. Based on the allocation 
criteria, bids providing information that helps in facilitating price discovery may be prioritised 
over other bids. For example, limit bids could be favoured over strike bids, considering that the 
latter only provide information on quantity but not price. To better ensure that efficient price 
discovery takes place, the criterion regarding the amount of information revealed could be 
made mandatory and it should rank as one of the most important factors to be taken into 
consideration. 
On one hand, the modified bookbuilding model provides wider transparency, as 
compared to the current bookbuilding regime. By making allocation criteria clear and explicit, 
investors would be able to know in advance how their choices would affect the priority assigned 
to their order. Additionally, there is less scope for underwriters to exploit their discretionary 
power since they would have to account for any discrepancies. Any signs of such exploitation 
should also trigger the relevant regulations on conflicts of interest, 104  which also aids in 
increasing public enforcement levels. Consequently, modified bookbuilding limits abuses by 
keeping in check the use of the underwriter’s discretionary powers. Given that excessive 
underpricing can be largely attributed to exploitations of conflicts of interest, modified 
bookbuilding also indirectly reduces the level of underpricing. Any underpricing that otherwise 
occurs is due to the need for compensations for information revelation. 
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On the other hand, in contrast to the standard allocation rules in ASX Bookbuilding, 
modified bookbuilding also allows allocation principles to be more personalised and suited to 
specific IPOs. It enables the issuing firm and its underwriter to take into account a variety of 
factors during the allocation process, rather than a single factor of the price of bids. It therefore 
addresses concerns that are beyond the proceeds of the IPO, such as an investor base with loyal 
long-term holders, as well as limiting the risks of failure. 
While firms may be concerned that it would be difficult to disclose precise allocation 
criteria at the early stages of the IPO, this should not be an issue as the aforementioned 
disclosure remains at a fairly broad level. Such a view has also been supported by the FCA, 
which expressed that ‘it should be possible to discuss allocation strategy in a broad sense’. 
Accordingly, the proposed disclosure regime is highly practical. Moreover, there have also 
been precedents for such modified bookbuilding in the past in the UK. In 1995, the seasoned 
equity offerings of National Power and PowerGen also sought to enhance the transparency of 
its bookbuilding to investors in a similar manner. Specifically, investors were divided into six 
categories of investor quality, based on criteria such as the price offered, and firm bids, as well 
as the likelihood of buying or holding shares in the aftermarket.105 The proposal to disclose 
allocation criteria would thus not be an entirely foreign concept. 
2. Private enforcement actions 
The overall effectiveness of the proposed disclosure framework has to be backed by an 
effective enforcement regime. Presently, the level of enforcement in the UK, which is almost 
entirely dependent on regulatory authorities, has been extremely low.106 It is thus submitted 
that section 138D of FSMA should also be extended to private actions, alongside the mandatory 
disclosure of allocation criteria at the outset that may aid in the regulators’ detections of failures 
to manage conflicts of interest. In this regard, the Law Commission has argued that an 
extension of section 138D of FSMA might increase litigation risks and costs, and promote 
overly defensive behaviours.107 However, these arguments, which were based on consultation 
responses, are unconvincing. Firstly, it was acknowledged in the report that the effects of the 
change are ‘uncertain’,108 that is, the problems associated with an extension of section 138D of 
FSMA are merely speculative. Secondly, the consultees who were quoted to be against the 
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extension consisted mainly of investment intermediaries, 109  thus casting doubt on the 
impartiality of their responses.  
On the other hand, extending section 138D of FSMA to private claims allows issuers 
to exercise market discipline and enhances monitoring of underwriters, and hence better control 
abuses of conflicts of interest. Such extension is especially favourable considering the current 
lack of regulatory enforcement, and the limited applicability of the common law regime, as 
detailed in Section C.2. Fears of excessive increased litigation risks are unfounded, given the 
UK’s relatively less active private securities litigation culture compared to the US. 110 
Moreover, underwriters should have nothing to fear if they can demonstrate that the decision 
was taken after due process and consideration. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The equity-raising market is paramount on several levels. It is critical to the well-being of firms 
and it also affects the efficiency of secondary trading markets. At the same time, a fair, efficient 
and transparent IPO market is an integral component of an allocative efficient economy. As the 
price formation process plays a central role in IPOs, this paper has sought to review the current 
UK pricing mechanism. In particular, it is argued that while the UK bookbuilding mechanism 
has its flaws, it is not without significant merits. These include its strength in facilitating 
information revelation, as well as other advantages associated with discretionary shares 
allocation. Furthermore, it is not the underwriter’s discretionary power on shares allocation and 
pricing per se that leads to conflicts of interest; rather, it is the lack of transparency associated 
with the discretion that is problematic. In other words, the inherent features of the UK 
bookbuilding system are beneficial. 
While critics have proposed the replacement of the bookbuilding system with the 
auction system, the latter is itself plagued with its own share of problems. Thus, there is no real 
need to replace the pricing model with the auction system, particularly since the latter 
introduces additional issues. Recognising the deficiencies of a pure auction model, some have 
also suggested the approach adopted in Australia. Although ASX Bookbuilding appears to be 
appealing, it is not without difficulties. Specifically, it removes the advantages of discretion 
that are associated with the present UK bookbuilding system. Its fundamental base of an 
auction system is also undesirable. On the other hand, the modified bookbuilding system 
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proposed in this paper retains the main benefits of the current bookbuilding model, while 
adding transparency elements and thus incorporating both discretionary and transparency 
features to capture the advantages of both bookbuilding and an auction model. Finally, it is 
proposed in light of the lack of regulatory enforcement, that s138D of FSMA be extended to 
private claims in order to ensure an effective implementation of the proposed framework. The 
way forward should be to build upon the current bookbuilding system by incorporating new 
disclosure requirements and extending the enforceability of rules, in order to cure the present 
ailments of the bookbuilding regime. 
